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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
 
COMPENSATION METHODS FOR DEMAND RESPONSE 
 
Recently, more and more disputations about how demand response should be 
compensated have arisen. Moreover, the court is about to rehear the Order 745. It 
probably will have significant impact on the whole working system used to be built for 
demand response before. Nowadays, some power companies and utilities think that they 
will endure profits leakage while demand response resources still are compensated.  
In this research, knowledge of demand response, local marginal price, Order 745 and 
other related concept will be explained in detail in case of misunderstanding. Associated 
with all these knowledge, a possible compensation method will be proposed. It combines 
many existing compensation methods. It mainly can be divided into three parts, i.e., high 
load period, off-peak period and low load period. The demand response resources will be 
compensated appropriately through these three periods. The compensation method 
endeavors to be just and reasonable.  
KEYWORDS:  Demand Response, Local Marginal Price, Compensation Methods, Order 
745. 
 
  Zhaofeng Wang 
Student’s Signature 
 5/8/2015 
 
Date 
  
II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPENSATION METHODS FOR DEMAND RESPONSE 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
Zhaofeng Wang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Dr. Yuan Liao 
 
(Director of Thesis) 
 
 
  Dr. Caicheng Lu 
(Director of Graduate Studies) 
 
5/8/2015 
    
(Date) 
  
III 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First of all, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Liao, for giving me this 
interesting topic. Demand response is one important aspect of future energy systems and 
a deep understanding of it will help create a more effective and balanced energy market. 
Dr, Liao showed his patience and passion in guiding me through the research, and he 
taught me some important concepts and methods. Moreover, when I met some problems, 
my advisor provided me with relevant articles and had discussions with me. With his 
help, I successfully achieved the original goal of this research.    
I would also like to thank Dr. Fei Zongming and Dr. Paul Dolloff for being my 
committee members. I would also like to thank my labmates Jie Chen, Ke Xu, Ke Chen 
and Zhengyuan Guan for their support. 
Last but not least, my parents provided me huge love and support during my 
research. 
  
IV 
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................... IV 
Table of Contents............................................................................................................ V 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................ VII 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................. VIII 
Chapter 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Order 745 ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 The coming problems of Order No. 745 ............................................................ 2 
Chapter 2 Chapter 2 Re-understand Order 745, Final Rule ............................................ 5 
2.1 Wholesale energy market ................................................................................... 6 
2.1.1 Day-ahead and real-time energy markets .................................................... 7 
2.2 Process of decision made ................................................................................... 8 
2.3 Cost-effectiveness conditions and Net benefit test ............................................ 9 
2.3.1 Net benefit test ............................................................................................. 9 
2.3.2 Cost-effectiveness conditions .................................................................... 10 
2.4 Cost allocation .................................................................................................. 11 
2.5 Benefits of Order 745 ....................................................................................... 15 
2.5.1 Effectiveness .............................................................................................. 15 
2.5.2 Functioning and Competition .................................................................... 16 
2.5.3 Compenstation Method.............................................................................. 18 
2.6 Discussion in Order 745 ................................................................................... 19 
2.6.1 Compensation level ................................................................................... 19 
2.6.2 Net benefits test ......................................................................................... 29 
V 
2.6.3 Measurement and Verification .................................................................. 31 
2.6.4 Cost Allocation .......................................................................................... 33 
2.6.5 Commission Jurisdiction ........................................................................... 33 
Chapter 3 Demand Response and Locational Marginal Price ....................................... 35 
3.1 Deamond Response .......................................................................................... 35 
3.1.1 Difference between DR and dynamic response ......................................... 36 
3.1.2 Demand response resource ........................................................................ 36 
3.1.3 Demand response programs....................................................................... 37 
3.2 Local Marginal Price ........................................................................................ 40 
3.2.1 Three components in LMP ........................................................................ 40 
3.2.2 Day-Ahead and Real-Time LMP ............................................................... 41 
3.2.3 Simple examples of LMP .......................................................................... 42 
3.2.4 LMP calculation in matlab ........................................................................ 43 
Chapter 4 The Proposed Compensation Method ........................................................... 51 
Chapter 5 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 54 
Reference. ...................................................................................................................... 55 
Vita……… .................................................................................................................... 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Retail rate for compensation method, LMP-G .................................................. 14 
Table 2.2 Retail rate for compensation method, LMP ...................................................... 15 
Table 2.3 Comparison of two compensation methods ...................................................... 15 
 
  
VII 
List of Figures 
Figure 3.1 Application of Demand Response Programs in 2008 in the U.S .................... 39 
Figure 3.2 A simple example of two generators and two buses ....................................... 42 
Figure 3.3 LMP calculated in matlab ................................................................................ 44 
Figure 3.4 Complex number calculation in p.u. system ................................................... 47 
Figure 3.5 LMP calculation of a complex problem in the matlab .................................... 48 
Figure 4.1 Brief introduction of compensation method .................................................... 51 
Figure 4.2 Statistic applied in real situation ...................................................................... 52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Recently, there are more and more disputations about how demand response 
works in the wholesale energy market and whether compensation methods of demand 
response are just and reasonable or not. Besides, if the full court finally makes its 
decision to rehear the case, it can overturn Order 745 which will be briefly introduced in 
the first part of this section. The other part in chapter one explains why there are so many 
problems about the Order being raised. The target of whole paper is to solve disputations 
and optimize current compensation methods through study of the Order 745 and relevant 
materials. 
 
1.1 Order 745 
What is the Order 745? With increasing deployment of renewable energy sources 
including wind, hydro and solar, together with traditional oil and coal based generation, it 
becomes more important to keep efficiency and stability of our wholesale energy market. 
The main purpose of Order No. 745 is to help wholesale energy markets to operate 
effectively to balance energy supply and demand. How does it work? The Order gives 
explanation that Demand Response (DR) plays as an alternative energy source to 
maintain the balance. When there is an outage and blackout, demand response programs 
will serve as an alternative resource to inform their customers to reduce energy 
consumption. Moreover, when the energy price is high enough because of high load 
demand, demand response will inform their customers as well. When either above 
condition meets, the demand response resource has to be compensated for its service at 
the energy market price referred as the Locational Marginal Price (LMP). In conclusion, 
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the Order not only ensures competitiveness of demand response resources in wholesale 
energy markets but also removes barriers that prohibit participation of demand response 
resources. Moreover, the Order makes sure that the wholesale energy price preserve at 
just and reasonable rate with help of demand response. Last but not least, it lays down 
authority for demand response to sustain system reliability and satisfy resource 
sufficiency by quick response to balance the electricity grid. The Commission does 
understand that in the future, the modification of dispatch algorithms will become even 
more difficult so that it requires each ISO or RTO to perform the net benefits test 
determining a basis every month. The basis is founded mostly on historical data that 
cover the previous year’s supply curve.  It is also necessary for ISO or RTO to develop a 
mechanism in which the probability is analyzed when it is cost-effective to compensate 
demand response resources with full LMP. One more important thing of Order 745 is that 
each ISO or RTO still set own compensation methods even the Order spends many pages 
in discussing how to compensate demand response. Those discussions will be analyzed 
and debated in detail later.  
 
1.2 The coming problems of Order No. 745 
As mentioned before, the full court is about to votes to rehear the case which may 
rescind Order 745. One of the problems is that Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) keeps the authority, which was approved by Congress under the Federal Powers 
Act (FPA), to regulate the wholesale energy price. However the Federal Powers Act 
doesn’t articulate what exactly should be done with demand response which means that 
the specific compensation method is not set. Therefore, there comes the confusion. The 
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Commission only rules that the compensation has to be relevant to LMP. Judging from 
previous experience, courts usually process the determination made by agencies like 
FERC who provide expertise on things which they regulated. Meanwhile the Commission 
made its decision mostly based on suggestions, feedback, and comments from ISO/RTO, 
DR companies, and DR customers. Therefore, we can infer that opinions from generator 
part are probably neglected. Moreover, although Order 745 successfully paved an entry 
for DR into the wholesale energy market without encroaching on state rights, the demand 
response resource is not restricted by a state’s decision or law. In addition, the Order was 
supposed to achieve the goal that demand response should be fairly and justly treated in 
the energy market so that it could compete with other traditional electricity resources 
such as coal, natural gas, and wind power. But currently, the court has decided to 
“devalue demand response in wholesale energy markets and reduced the incentive for 
demand response providers to offer this service.”1 In a word, the court doubts former 
value which was by demand response resources under permission of Order 745. 
Moreover, in order to remove barriers that prohibit participation of demand response, the 
Commission greatly supports the wholesale energy market being competitive. On the 
other hand, Judge Janice Roger Brown, who might represent for viewpoint of the court, 
demonstrated that FERC removed barriers way too much instead of simply removing 
barriers. To keep consistent with the removing barriers rule in Order 890, the 
Commission further modified the Open Access Transmission Tariff allowing resources 
which cannot generate power themselves, especially demand response resources, to share 
and use most of ancillary services which were used to be built for generation resources in 
order 745. This could be on of reasons bringing unjust profits to demand response. Based 
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on the feedback and comments, some people think that demand response resources can 
take advantages of the platform which has been built between ancillary services and 
generation resources.  
Additionally, Judge Janice Roger Brown’s continued to state, “The issue at hand 
was not just whether the payments were too high, but rather who has the authority to set 
those payments.”2 This will bring back the question that the method of setting those 
payments is ambiguous. Although the Commission makes the rule that compensation to 
demand response resource must be based on its service and the market energy price that 
refers to local marginal price, the approach how to lay down payment is quite different 
from every ISO and RTO. Each ISO or RTO still uses its own way to deal with demand 
response resource to reach maximum interest even the Commission makes the final call. 
This problem will be exaggerated and particularly discussed during the comments part. 
Demand response provider can achieve both reducing energy consumption and 
maximizing profits under current conditions.  On the other hand, it probably neglects the 
damage to generation sources or other companies who may endure interest leakage. For 
the defense of Order 745, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission stated that it didn’t 
guarantee everyone’s profit. Another problem is that the demand response, modified 
under Order 745 somehow raised energy payments instead of decreasing them. There is 
another saying that only large companies, like commercial and industrial customers, 
could understand enough about demand response and then invest in the economic DR 
market to gain profits. Some power producers also raise their concerns about 
compensation of demand response is that the energy price is not only raised but also 
unfair that “those customers have already been compensated in the form of lower power 
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bills from using less energy”. For example, some DR companies, such as EnerNoc and 
Viridity Energy, were already praised for the fair way to compensate customers for 
implementing real-time power-down technology in their buildings and factories.3 This 
situation is called overcompensation. Some ISO and RTO compensate DRR with LMP 
which was regarded as a double payment which will be introduced in the discussion part. 
No matter how demand response is known as an effective way to reduce energy use, 
some U.S. utility trade groups and power producers begin to stand against Order 745 on 
demand response part. 
It cannot be denied that rehearing may lead undercut or even discard one of the 
brightest energy future, demand response. Actually, any innovation grows with 
disputations. The development of demand response really needs time and patience. This 
thesis carries the opinion that it is unnecessary for the court to hold rehearing. Instead, 
certain modification can facilitate demand response to work better and contribute more in 
the energy market. In the following parts, advantages of demand response and re-
understanding of Order 745 explain how effective an energy market will be with the 
operation of demand response.  
  
Chapter 2 Chapter 2 Re-understand Order 745, Final Rule 
Even though decision of rehearing the case won’t affect DR keeps playing more 
and more important role in energy markets, such as PJM, a setback will happen. In order 
to avoid such bad situation happening, this part is dedicated to deeply introduce the Order 
745 and provide suggestion about optimizing DR. 
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2.1 Wholesale energy market 
According the Final Rule, the compensation methods are introduced through 
organized wholesale energy market which contains two parts, Regional Transmission 
Organization (RTO) and Independent System Operator (ISO). What’s the wholesale 
energy market? As we all know, electricity is normally generated by a power company. 
However, it won’t be directly delivered to its end-use customers. Instead, it has to be 
purchased and re-sold for a bunch of times before reaching the end-use customers just 
like other commodity such as oil and stock. In summary, a wholesale energy market 
should consist of sale and re-sale processes.  Basically, anyone can take part in the 
wholesale energy market under certain approvals. One condition is that power providers 
can become effective participants only when there is a customer or more who are willing 
to purchase those providers’ power output. For individual trader and power marketers, 
they can buy and resell power through the market instead of generating energy if they 
want to participate in the wholesale energy market. There are many types of these 
participators. They include competitive independent power producers (IPPs). They do not 
belong to any utilities. For example, individuals purchase photovoltaic boards to generate 
power for individual use or sale to preferential power utilities. Participations can also be 
power suppliers and market traders connected to utilities. Traditional integrated utilities 
become participations when they begin selling extra power.4 The competition among 
these participations have to be fair and just. Demand response resource doesn’t produce 
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energy at all and it is defined as a service instead of sale and resale energy marketers. 
Now, the brief structure of wholesale energy market will be introduced. There are two 
kinds of operation methods in the U.S. The most common trade which is widely applied 
in the wholesale energy market is multi-state interconnection. It can be regarded as 
interstate sales. In this operation method, the wholesale energy market is regulated across 
the country under ISOs and RTOs. It covers the region of Northeast, California, Mid-
Atlantic, much of the Midwest, and ERCOT. But the ERCOT doesn’t perform as others 
do. ERCOT’s entire line lies only in state, Texas, and it has no connection with other 
states. The ISO/RTO structure guarantees the competition as well. Actually, two-thirds of 
the electricity is spent through ISO/RTO in the U.S. The other operation way is known as 
a traditional operation method. The regions including the Southeast, Southwest, 
Northwest, Inter-Mountain West, and vertically-integrated utilities still observe and take 
charge of transmission lines. More importantly, it will choose its favored generation 
resource instead of more effective and energy saving one to dispatch electricity during 
certain hours because of no competition of multi-state.  
2.1.1 Day-ahead and real-time energy markets 
The wholesale energy market also can be divided into day-ahead and real-time 
markets. The day-ahead market calculates and determines the LMPs one day before the 
operating day. Normally, it will inform its customers and allow them to trade wholesale 
electricity in order to help them avoid changeable energy price. The LMPs are based on 
demand bids, generation offers, transactions, and so on.5 The advantage of this market is 
that payment of its customers is settled. On the other hand, the real-time market is 
calculating current LMPs at several minutes interval which will directly reveals actual 
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grid operating conditions. For example, New England’s ISO (NEISO) sets the interval as 
5 minutes.  Moreover, different from a day-ahead market, participants of the real-time 
energy market can trade the electricity during operating day. The advantage of real-time 
energy market is its flexibility. It can immediately supply the real-time demand to keep 
the balance of grid. Therefore, the difference between two markets can be met. 
Meanwhile, a separate and second financial settlement will be created by the real-time 
energy market as well. The real-time LMP will be predicated and then established. It is 
used to be a standard to charge customers or compensate electricity reduction and 
generation in the day-ahead energy market.6 However, the difficulties of predicting and 
measuring real-time energy price are obvious.  
For the convenience of their customers and themselves, most ISOs and RTOs will 
provide them plenty of information which they are willing to know. Customers can 
directly view their information online or download them for later use after they log in 
own accounts. The information will be illustrated through column, line, and pie charts 
including and tables. All of them demonstrate all kinds of energy price, management of 
loads, day-ahead and real-time LMP, and actual power system condition.7 With the help 
of above information, the customers can read grid condition easily and make appropriate 
decisions.   
 
 
2.2 Process of decision made 
The section mainly explains that why it is unfair to revoke Order 745. First of all, 
every decision made in the Order has been discussed thoughtfully. For example, on 
March 18, 2010, the Commission, in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) raised 
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a way to eliminate current concerns that may prevent meaningful demand-side’s 
participation. Before carrying out the final action, there are about 3,800 pages of 
comments being reviewed and a technical conference being held subsequently. Therefore, 
there are many complicated processes before the Commission makes the final decision. 
As mentioned in the beginning, the Commission cannot guarantee everyone’s profit. In 
the discussion part, the Commission will tell that how difficultly and carefully it makes 
the final determination. Therefore, it is unfair to turn over everything about demand 
response in Order 745. Demand response will become more developed in management, 
rules, and restriction under certain modification with time.   
 
2.3 Cost-effectiveness conditions and Net benefit test 
Under definition, a demand response resource has the ability to maintain the 
balance between supply and demand as an alternative generation resource under RTO and 
ISO’s structure. Meanwhile, it is important to make sure the efficiency of demand 
response when it serves as an alternative resource. Cost-effectiveness condition and net 
benefit test are two related components in Order 745 to determine when demand response 
has to be compensated at energy price referred to LMP. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
compensate demand response when it is cost-effective which is determined by the net 
benefits test.  
2.3.1 Net benefit test 
Before implementing the net benefits test, both RTO and ISO are required to 
approximately predict that at what price level when demand response will be cost-
effectively dispatching. Moreover, the price level is usually based on former supply curve 
9 
and real time changing condition. Therefore, the level should be updated frequently. In 
conclusion, the ISO or RTO should determine the monthly threshold price that represent 
for the standard of net benefit test. Under following situation, dispatching demand 
response will have net benefit effect. As DR resource plays as an alternative generation 
resource, it will reduce the overall LMP because it substitutes other generation resources.  
Dispatching DR will be cost-effective when advantages from reduced LMP which is 
caused by demand response are beyond the spending of dispatching and paying LMP to 
demand response resources. In conclusion, the net benefit test becomes a critical 
condition to decide whether the dispatch of DR resources is cost-effective or not.  
2.3.2 Cost-effectiveness conditions 
Cost-effectiveness conditions are especially important because the Commission 
can apply compensation approach only when demand response resources are 
satisfactorily capable and cost-effective. It is widely known that customers are paying 
bills based on how many energy units (MWh) they consume. Additionally, change in the 
size of energy market will relatively vary the LMP.  When the amount of the load, which 
is supposed to pay the electricity bill, decreases, cost per unit ($/MWh) will be 
unintentionally increased because of dispatching demand response resources. 
Furthermore, it will break the balance of wholesale load. This possible result is regarded 
as the billing unit effect when demand response is delivered. On the other hand, 
generation resources dispatching does not lead a drop of load, there won’t be the billing 
unit effect.   
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2.4 Cost allocation 
In the accounting category, cost allocation is a process of providing relief to 
shared service organization's cost centers that provide a product or service. In turn, the 
associated expense is assigned to internal clients' cost centers that consume the products 
and services.8 In the research, cost allocation is the process that cost will be reasonably 
distributed to one or more groups. Costs can be allocated only arrangement and cost 
allocation of the work are in the same proportion. In addition, there must be direct benefit 
proof related to those cost. Demand response resources are allocable if they benefit 
energy market from energy deduction. Furthermore, if the expense is used on multiple 
projects, it is necessary to determine proportion of the expense and benefits spent on each 
project then charge accordingly. When allocating multiple projects costs, the Principal 
Investigator working with the Research Administrators must ensure two things. One of 
them is that the costs are reasonable; the other one is that costs allocated for each one 
project should have appropriate documentation which reflects the Principal Investigator’s 
judgment and indicate percentages or amounts of benefits in every project. The allocation 
method must be reasonable and must relate to the costs being charged. There are several 
points about allocation which need to be remembered. First of all, some documents such 
as headcount, square footage or hours directly relate to received benefit, have to be 
remembered. Moreover, some allocation methodologies, like budge, funding or available 
funds, is forbidden. Additionally, administrative expenses won’t be regarded as one part 
of sponsored project to be charged. More importantly, allocation methodologies should 
be documented, auditable, and reviewed and updated periodically to ensure they are 
reasonable.9  
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Allocation method is generally based on effort or usage. Here is an example 
explaining allocation based on effort. There are two projects, A and B. A researcher 
spends 80% effort on A and the rest effort on B. The researcher spends total $5,000 on 
those projects. Since expense is directly related to the percentage of effort devoted to the 
project. Therefore, $4,000 (80% of $5,000) is charged to A and the rest, $1,000, is 
charged to B. What’s going on if allocation method is based on usage? Suppose the 
maintenance fee of a computer lab is $10,000. The computer system is only available to 
class A and B. A reasonable base to allocate the expense would be computer user hours. 
Class A occupies the lab 150 hours in total. And class B takes advantage of the lab 50 
hours. Based on usage allocation method, the cost allocated to class A is $7,500 (100/200 
x $10,000). On the other hand, the cost allocated to project B would be $2,500 (50/200 x 
$1,000). 
The allocation method for demand response will be discussed below. Now please 
forget about the U.S. court’s opinion about vacating Order 745 at this moment, most 
ISO/RTO markets admit the capability of Demand Response Resource (DDR) capability. 
For example, MISO shows great willingness to implement DDR in its market. This Final 
Rule requires that each ISO and RTO to raise a method to allocate payments of demand 
response if their clients gain benefits from the lower LMP because of applying demand 
response. In accordance with Order 745, MISO worked with stakeholders to determine 
the best method for allocating costs for demand response. During that process, there are 
two keys which need be paid attention to. First of all, when Locational Marginal Price 
(LMP) is greater than the threshold for net benefit test, the right method to compensate 
demand response resource, take LMP as an example here, needs to be chosen carefully. 
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Secondly, cost allocation for demand response should be applied with necessarily the 
same proportion amount of load reduction in each location. Surcharges applied to all 
buyers in the real-time energy market in the applicable zone pro rata.10   
Here is an example which ISO-NE used to test the impact of demand response 
cost allocation methods on basic service rates and on overall consumer costs for two 
compensation methods to demand response,  DR providers are paid the locational 
marginal price less the retail generation rate and  the full LMP for demand reductions.11 
LMPt represent for LMP at hour t; Lt is the loads at hour t; Dt means demand reductions 
at hour t; Gt is the generator’s output at hour t; RR is the retail generation rate. The 
superscript 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 or 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  is used to represent for the price or the quantity applied in the day-
ahead market or the real-time market. In the first compensation method, which is paying 
LMP-G to demand response, three payments from generator, LSE and DR are added 
together. There yields a positive settlement imbalance, missing money, equal 
to (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) × 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅. When there is no DR’s participation, the profit of LSE will 
become 𝐿𝐿0 = ∑ (−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 +  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅0 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 . Customer payment (C0) under basic 
situation is 𝐶𝐶0 =  ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅0 ×𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, which obviously is the last part of former equation. 
When all DR costs are allocated to the LSE, then the profit of LSE is  
𝐿𝐿1 = ∑ (−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 . In this equation, it implies that LSE has to make 
up the missing money. And 𝐶𝐶1𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1 ×𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)When LDC is required to pay all 
DR costs, the profit of LSE becomes 𝐿𝐿2 = ∑ [−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 −𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2) × 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡] where 𝐶𝐶2 =  ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 ×𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) + ∑ (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2)𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 . In order to 
compare customers’ payment, all profits of LSE are set to zero. It is meaningless to 
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analyze the condition when t is equal to zero. Then Table 2.1 shows the equation of retail 
rate at three different situations. 
RR0 �(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
/�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
 
RR1 �(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
/�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
 
RR2 �[𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)]𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
/�(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
 
Table 2.1Retail rate for compensation method, LMP-G 
Compare these rates and have relation RR2 < RR1 = RR0. Substitute these three RR back 
to the customer’s payments and process the comparison, C1 < C2 < C0.  
Similarly, when the compensation to demand response is only LMP, 
𝐿𝐿1
′ = ∑ [−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1′ × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)]𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐿𝐿2′ = ∑ [−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) +𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2′ × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)]. The customer’s payment will become 𝐶𝐶1′ =  ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1′ ×𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) =
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶2′ =  ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2′ ×𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) + ∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 = ∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ×𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 The difference is that there applied a hybrid method that the cost is allocated into the 
LSE and the LDC each hour respectively. Then 𝐿𝐿3′ = ∑ [−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 +  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3′ × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡]𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 . 
And 𝐶𝐶3′ =  ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3′ ×𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) + ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3′ × 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=0 = ∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡=1 . Therefore, no 
matter how the rate changes in the second compensation method, customers’ payments 
stay the same. There are listed three retail rates for the second compensation method 
when profit of LSE is set to zero.  Table 2.2 reveals the above situation. 
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RR1’ �(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
/�(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
 
RR2’ �[𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)]𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
/�(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
 
RR3’ �(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 × 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
/�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅
𝑡𝑡=0
 
Table 2.2 Retail rate for compensation method, LMP 
Table 2.3 compares all retail rates and customers’ payments,  
Retail Generation Rate Consumer Payments 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1
′ >  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿1′ >  𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿1 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2
′ =  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿2′ >  𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿2 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3
′ = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅3′ >  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿3′ >  𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿1 and 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿3′ >  𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿2 
Table 2.3 Comparison of two compensation methods 
 
 
2.5 Benefits of Order 745 
In this chapter, benefits of applying Order 745 will be introduced. In this way, 
people can notice the advantages of applying Order 745 and the court may change the 
idea about rehearing the Order.  
2.5.1 Effectiveness 
As mentioned at the beginning of the article, one of great benefits of the Order 
745 is it facilitates DR to balance energy supply and demand. It is needed to keep the 
wholesale energy markets operating effectively. During that process, DRR encourages its 
customers to reduce electricity consumption in response to price signals which will be 
introduced in the Demand Response part later.  
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2.5.2 Functioning and Competition 
In Order 745, the FERC greatly removes barriers of participating in wholesale 
energy market for demand response resources to support competitive wholesale energy 
markets. Under the Open Access Transmission Tariff, demand response programs are 
supposed to be treated same as generation and they are allowed to participate into the 
wholesale energy market without restrictions. Furthermore, to ensure functioning of 
demand response, transmission provider is required to share it transmission pathway to 
all resources, including demand response, without bias. Therefore, those resources can 
compete with each other equally. Associated with Order No. 719, RTOs and ISOs can 
accept bids when demand response performs as ancillary services competing with other 
resources on a comparable basis under the permission of the Commission. The 
Commission also required each RTO and ISO to modify its existing market rules to 
reflect energy price during an operating reserve shortage. All the processes mentioned 
above can effectively encourage the innovation and participation of new generation and 
demand resources.  
In addition, order 745 enormously helps demand response to increase competition 
although great competition may bring fluctuation of the energy price for the wholesale 
energy market. Therefore, the Commission is responsible for regulating the compensation 
methods that ensures electric energy at fair, reasonable and practical rates. In Order 719, 
demand response can expand the wholesale competition that turn out to be effective only 
when consumers are being provided with enough supply options, development and 
innovation of demand response are highly encouraged, performance of demand response 
resource is improved, energy cost is affected and then saved, and customers perhaps get 
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rid of risks.12 To ensure the functioning and competiveness of wholesale energy markets, 
several ways are going to be demonstrated. First of all, demand response not only 
facilitates RTOs and ISOs in balancing supply and demand but also helps electricity 
maintain at just and reasonable prices when its bid is directly guided into the wholesale 
market. The customers will provide a feedback signal, which informs the RTO or ISO 
and energy market that they would like to reduce energy consumption, in response to the 
reduced-load signal stimulated by RTO/ISO and energy market. According to report 
provided by PJM, a small amount of decreased load will lead a larger amount of dropping 
price. For example, a three percent reduction in load has equivalent effect of a 6 to 12 
percent price decline at peak load hours. In a word, demand response has the ability to 
flatten load curve. High-priced resources also will be less dispatched with help of demand 
response. Ultimately, the cost of producing energy will be lowered as well. Secondly, 
demand response provides electricity reliability in the short-term and resource adequacy 
in the long-term. More importantly, it can mitigate generator market power. A power 
supplier has to undertake the risk that it may not possess the ability to dispatch the 
electricity if the bid price is too high. The downward pressure comes from participation 
of demand response. Last but not least, when energy outage or blackout suddenly 
happens, demand response resources are capable of bringing electricity grid back into 
balance quickly. For example, in the winter of 2014, when people in the Northeast area 
greatly used electricity to keep warm inside their house, a disaster came to them. Because 
of severely cold weather, up to 20% of power plants were off-line. Luckily, demand 
response stimulated customers to reduce their electricity usage by 1,900 MW in parts of 
the Midwest and Northeast which is covered by ‘PJM Interconnection’.13 Hence, demand 
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response can potentially support system reliability, which means to prevent forced 
outages and blackouts from happening, and solve the challenges and problems from 
unexpected loss of generation to sustain functioning of the wholesale energy market.  
2.5.3 Compenstation Method 
There are several reasons, such as unique state authority and transmission 
congestion, which may cause difficulties unifying compensation methods. Therefore, the 
Commission gives its permission to each RTO and ISO so that they can develop their 
own compensation methodologies. In this case, the compensation levels for demand 
response will differ tremendously among RTOs and ISOs. There are listed three different 
compensation methods below. For example, in PJM Interconnection, it pays demand 
response with the LMP minus the generation retail rate. Although the ISO-NE tested both 
LMP and LMP-RR payment, demand response is still compensated by LMP when prices 
jump over the threshold level. Usually, the setting threshold points are quite different 
between the RTOs. According to Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator 
Inc.’s (Midwest ISO), demand response resources are paid LMP in both day-ahead and 
real-time markets.  
There is a saying that one of the reasons causing so many disputations is various 
compensation methods among ISOs and RTOs. In this research, there eventually 
proposes one optimal method for compensating demand response based on current 
methods. The method probably can mitigate controversies. 
 
 
 
18 
2.6 Discussion in Order 745 
There are many discussions on compensation level of demand response resources, 
net benefit test, measurement and verification, cost allocation and the Commission 
jurisdiction. The Commission here hopes to reach uniformity and conclude the final 
determination through plenty of comments on those different subjects. 
2.6.1 Compensation level 
If both generation and demand response resource offer equivalent service to 
RTOs and ISOs, the NOPR will promise to comparably treat and compensate generation 
and demand response providers for their cost. It states as well that the proposed 
compensation was intended to encourage participation of demand response resources in 
wholesale energy market. Moreover, investment fee will be fully covered as an 
encouragement method if it is related to technology of demand response such as 
advanced metering. Before the final determination, the Commission expected various 
comments on compensation, especially on comparability and flexibility of generation and 
demand response resources. Commenters also give opinions about approaches to 
compensate demand response. For instance, when payment of LMP should be effective 
by hours or in what kind of condition LMP should apply in hours. Additionally, the 
Commission sought comments on net benefits test in supplemental NOPR.  
Some commenters announce that a MW increment of generation is physically 
comparable to the same amount of electricity decrement. For the purpose of balancing 
supply and demand in both energy markets, they have same influence. These commenters 
believe that demand response can play as a superior service to generation by providing a 
quick response in advanced meter system and saving money from constructing new 
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energy generation facilities. Therefore, substitution of demand response for generation 
will create great system flexibility when some parts of the generation do not functionally 
work. Moreover, they insist that distinguishing the physical characteristics between 
generation and demand response is not only difficult but also unacceptable at present. 
Demand response will improve the competition of market that forces manage load and 
indistinguishableness treatment in advance. Therefore, they suggest that demand 
resources must be paid LMP same as generator is paid if their bids are accepted by the 
grid operator for the purpose of reaching grid balance. Other commenters hold different 
opinion against that generation is physically equal to demand response. For example, 
Public Service Electric and Gas (PSEG) argues that one MW drop of consumed energy 
created by demand response is incommensurable compared to the contribution made by a 
MW energy generated by generation.  In its defense, demand response is usually used to 
operate only in a limited number of times during the peak period. According to a report 
of PJM, demand response only effectively performs 10 times and six hours between each 
response during the entire summer peak period. In contrast, generators are available for 
deliver power from time to time except when there is scheduled maintenance and 
unpredictable outages. The argument sticks with the idea that although demand response 
resources can become backups for generation resources, the service provided by the 
generation resources still is superior to service provided by demand response resources 
because demand response has huge positive effect only for a short time. For a long period 
operation, demand responses becomes unnecessary most of time. They continue pointing 
out that demand response aims to reduce energy consumption while generators are able to 
serve electricity consumption. Their argument is that demand reduction does not turn on 
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the lights. Demand reduction can only allow extra electron created by the reduction to 
serve a different customer. More importantly, generating plants are able to support a 
power system functionally without any demand response. On the contrary, demand 
response cannot serve a power plant alone. Moreover, traditional generators can provide 
system with ancillary features such as governor response or reactive power voltage 
support. Those features cannot be guaranteed by demand response resources. 
Economically, there are two totally opposite attitude about the comparability of 
demand response and generator. Some people indicate that any compensation methods 
for demand response beyond LMP minus the generation (or G) component of the retail 
rate are unjust and unreasonable because demand response provider will receive 
overcompensation at this point. It does bring demand reduction but break the economic 
efficiency. The double-payment is also one kind of overcompensations when 
compensation is LMP. In double-payment, demand response providers will receive not 
only the cost savings from not consuming an increment of electricity at a retail rate but 
also a LMP compensation for not consuming the increment of electricity. Simultaneously, 
any compensation except LMP-G, like paying LMP, will gain company unreasonable 
profit and break the efficient balance even benefits of consuming electricity exceed 
advantages of being compensated at LMP. From Dr. Hogan’s viewpoint, in order to 
achieve economic efficiency, demand response compensation has to be implemented at 
the LMP under real-time pricing situation. But in reality, it is impossible currently. While 
he believes that compared to pay LMP, it is better to balance demand responses and 
generations if payment to demand response compensation is the amount of LMP-G or 
other approaches. Based on the argument of the New York Commission, when the 
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payment to demand response is LMP-G, there would be a problem in tracking retail rates 
among multiple utilities would result in an administrative burden of tracking retail rates 
for the multiple utilities. The administrative burden of tracking rates may produce undue 
confusion for retail customers. There would be administrative difficulties for state 
commissions and ISOs/ RTOs as well.14  
Some commenters would like to believe that demand response resource acts like a 
sale and resale energy resource because it purchase the power in the day-ahead market 
and resell it in the real-time market. Some of them even assert that demand response 
providers perform much better than a reselling energy because it actually possesses the 
electricity. On the other hand, other commenters state that there won’t be too much 
demand reduction if demand response providers compel their customers to purchase and 
resell electricity. They firmly believe that it is erroneous and flawed to treat demand 
response as one kind of energy being purchased and then resold.  Actually, the 
Commission officially rejected former definition of demand response as a reselling 
energy in EnergyConnect. Under the Commission’s description, demand response is 
more like a service rather than a reselling energy.  
Other demand response supporters disagree with Dr. Hogan’s judgement that 
paying LMP for demand response will break the balance between demand response 
resources and generators. They think compensation to demand response at LMP 
providers does not create more advantage for demand response over generators. They 
demonstrate that Dr.Hogan’s arguments ignore various locations in the wholesale power 
markets, exaggerate limits of the Commission’s jurisdiction, misunderstand affects 
caused by unstable condition such as fuels pricing, environmental attributes, participation, 
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and so on. The arguments also fail to account for other complex parts such as difference 
among prices, equipment operational requirements, etc.  
Besides physical and economic aspects, a lot of commenters separately compare 
the environmental effects triggered by both generation and demand response resources. 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) reports that current market prices easily neglect 
issues created by generation. Traditional generations generate power with air pollution 
and greenhouse effect; power plants occupy huge lands; maintenance fee of those plants 
are high. These social impacts will become especially fluctuant at high load period. It is 
obvious that demand response does not produce greenhouse emission at all. Therefore, 
demand response should be compensated more than LMP. On the contrary, some people 
suggest that paying LMP for demand response is meaningless because it merely 
encourage load to be switched off but still being compensated. Under this situation, some 
generations which are not under management of advanced meters produce more 
greenhouse gases and air pollution.  
Some commenters suggest not paying demand response LMP in all hours because 
it won’t bring net benefits to customers from time to time, especially at off-peak time. 
They hold opinions that demand response providers can be only praised at LMP when 
advantages of dispatching demand response carrying energy reduction from are over cost 
of paying demand response resources as net benefits or cost-effectiveness test describes. 
According to experience, net benefits can reach enormously huge at peak period which 
potentially means demand response has apparently positive affect at peak period and a 
cost effective test may be unnecessary. Thus, some commenters consider that the purpose 
of either of these two tests would be to decide in what condition payment of LMP can 
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apply. The equilibrium point will be set at the time when the benefits created by reducing 
load are equal to the payments to demand response. People those who against use a net 
benefit test firmly believe that a net benefits test is not only one reason to reduce 
competition but also costly and complex to implement. No matter what the compensation 
for demand response resources will be, the generation and demand response should be 
properly compensated based on the contribution they devote to the system. Moreover, the 
rules can be applied to both resources.  
From all feedback stated above, those feedback are split in different groups. The 
Commission gets to summarize and conclude those opinions into several compensation 
levels for demand response resources. One part of them is paying the LMP for demand 
reductions in all hours in both day-ahead and real-time energy markets, another group 
insists that it is appropriate to compensate demand response LMP for energy 
consumption reductions it contributes only when it is cost- effective, and the rest opposes 
compensation LMP for demand reductions under any conditions believing that it will lead 
a distortion or over-compensation. When the Commission makes the judgment of these 
diverging comments, it will both consider restriction from economic analysis and take the 
practical realities of how markets work into account as well because the compensation 
method involves no technical part when policy associated with regulatory mission. Since 
the Commission concludes three general conditions, it begins to response to those 
conditions respectively. First of all, based on the various comments and record from ISOs, 
the Commission agrees that compensation of LMP to demand response resources should 
be set under the conditions that the payment is cost-effective determined as the net 
benefits test described. When the following two conditions meet, any payment except the 
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LMP from an RTO or ISO to demand response is unjust and inappropriate. Moreover, the 
marginal value of the resource is revealed. The first condition is that DRR is capable of 
providing the service as a substitution to generation resources in order to help to maintain 
the balance between supply and demand. The requirement of the first condition is 
availability of dispatching demand response anytime when it is needed.  The second 
condition is that payment of LMP for DRR is proved to be cost-effective when demand 
response is dispatched as an alternative resource.   
As introduced before, it is cost effective when dispatching DRRs reduce the 
amount of customers’ bill. While it still may lead an increased cost per unit to with the 
decreased amount of load. There are three components that may result in the difference, 
the LMP value of demand response, the total amount of dispatched demand response, and 
the changing capability of energy market that is the most important key component. 
However, from customer’s point, cost-effective condition is that when implementing 
demand response does bring a demand reduction at LMP, the total amount, which 
customers pay for demand response resources, is greater than the money spent in getting 
access to the resources. For example, assume that a market has capacity of 200 MW and 
$50/MWh LMP without DR. Currently, there is dispatched a 10 MW of demand response 
where LMP is $40/MWh. With the participation of demand response, the total payment 
to generators and load will become $8,000 instead of former $10,000 while the reduced 
LMP is now being paid by 190 MW which is less than the previous load, 200 MW. After 
calculation, every remaining customer only needs to pay 42.11/MWh ($8,000/190) that 
decrease a lot from the previous payment, $50/MWh. Therefore, it is cost-effective to pay 
LMP to demand response in this example. In comparison, customers have to endure a net 
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loss when the reduction of total cost does not bring a decrease of each customer’s 
payment. For instance, similar example to last one, change the adding LMP of demand 
response to $48/MWh. The total payment to generators and load will become $9,600 
instead of former $10,000 while the reduced LMP is still being paid by 190 MW. This 
time, every remaining customer needs to pay 50.53/MWh ($9,600/190) that increase 
slightly compared to the previous payment, $50/MWh. From this result, it can be referred 
that payment of remaining customer apparently increases. Hence, customers experience a 
net loss. In this situation, implementation of the net benefits test can appropriately help 
RTO or ISO judge which condition customers will go through. Without the net benefits 
test as a reference, the RTO’s or ISO’s economic dispatch would have no choice but to 
select the lowest bid demand response even it potentially increase payment of customers. 
From second example, it can be concluded that dispatching of demand response resource 
would bring a higher price payment to remaining customers than payment to the next unit 
of generation if the demand response resource is not much cheaper than the generation. 
Then customers will suffer a net loss. While the lowest demand response resource will 
still stay at first dispatching order because of most competitive price. This situation 
cannot be considered as a cost-effective condition so that demand response cannot be 
allowed to join in the market. In order to prevent similar situation happening in the reality, 
the billing unit effect must be taken into account as a standard to decide whether and 
demand response resources when demand response is ready for implement. Therefore, in 
order to prevent a net loss for customers, the application of the net benefit test is 
necessary to determine when the total benefit produced by reduced LMP from 
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dispatching demand response resources surpasses the cost of those resources under 
requirement of the Commission.  
Even some commenters point out that it is incorrect to pay consumers for not 
consuming electricity, the Commission states that DRR is worth being compensated for 
consumption reduction because demand response can achieve the function as generation 
can, keeping the balance of the market. Those commenters who point out the 
inappropriateness inadequately understand an extraordinary characteristic of demand 
response resources. It is necessary and important for demand response to offer an 
instantaneous balance to maintain reliability of the market. Therefore, the Commission 
makes its statement that demand response resources should be compensated at LMP for 
the contribution it can provide to the organized wholesale energy markets.  
Although great efforts has been proceeded to facilitate demand response, barriers 
still remain and prohibit the willing of demand response to participate in the wholesale 
energy market. The Commission wants to exclude barriers here. Appling appropriate 
compensation method can accelerate the removing barriers processes. The formation of 
these barriers usually contains several parts. First of all, the change of dynamic retail 
prices is unpredictable; real-time information is confidential under each power companies; 
there are not enough technologies and incentive methods informing their customers about 
the changing retail price; the connection between wholesale and retail prices is vague and 
undefined. The Commission concludes that paying LMP can help to remove current 
barriers for new demand response providers and potentially informed them that they will 
be fairly compensated. Elimination barriers for demand response certainly will increase 
investment of demand response resources. It also encourages more people and groups to 
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research and develop the resources. Moreover, the Commission also recognizes that 
removing barriers does not mean that DR providers will be preferential treated. Instead, it 
raises great competition for both generation and demand response. During the completion, 
demand response resource has to not only balance supply and demand but also carefully 
face competition from other demand response providers. Therefore, the Commission 
needs to clarify the correct competition methods as well after simply removing barriers. 
In this part, the Commission points out that demand response resources shouldn’t be paid 
LMP-G in all hours. First of all, as mentioned before, when net benefits test decide that 
demand response resources are cost-effective, demand response resource ought to be 
compensated at LMP. Additionally, these arguments fail to realize that existing barriers 
to demand response is the main reason leading an imperfect market. Paying LMP to 
demand response has been proved to be right compensation way to remove barriers. 
Moreover, the comments of paying LMP-G are built on the supposition that demand 
response is regarded as an energy which may be purchased and sold in the energy market. 
This assumption has already revised by the Commission. The Commission encourages in 
a single pricing rule that will not be easily changed even difference in market structure, 
state regulatory environment, and resource mixed during the ISOs and RTOs. When 
demand response can balance under the net benefits test, no matter what differences are, 
it is a cost-effective and alternative resource in the wholesale energy markets. It can be 
compensated at LMP. Only further report and data release that there are huge differences 
may bring change to payment of demand response resource, the Commission will check 
and make decision on that payment method. Meanwhile, any one of conditions happens, 
the balance will be broken. The net benefit test cannot be satisfied and the demand 
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response is not cost-effective any more. The Commission’s findings in this Final Rule do 
not reject other approaches to compensation. Actually, the Commission authorize each 
ISO and RTO to develop own compensation method only if it is just and reasonable.  
 
2.6.2 Net benefits test 
This part is mainly about whether net-benefits test should be applied or not. As 
mentioned in the last part, net benefit test is usually used to regulate when it is necessary 
to compensate demand response with energy price related to LMP. There were still 
different opinions about how to use net benefit test before the Commission made its final 
call. First of all, some commenters think it is unnecessary to utilize net-benefit test. They 
suggested using a static threshold, a net-benefit trigger, which is determined by ISO or 
RTO. As an example, NYISO compensates demand response resources when the price 
hits the threshold. Currently, the NYISO uses $75/MWh as its static bid threshold in the 
day-ahead demand response program. Different with setting a stable and static threshold 
point, other commenters believe that it cannot actually represent for changes occurred in 
electricity. It may even bring inefficient dispatch of demand resources. Instead, they 
assert that using a dynamic bid threshold can become more determinable when LMP 
payment applies. For those people, they think that static bid threshold prevents the 
participation of demand response programs. Therefore, a static threshold cannot simply 
deal with changeable energy market prices while a dynamic one can. However, other 
commenters still think that net benefit test is very important to decide when 
compensation of demand response at LMP will be cost-effective. Therefore, 
identification of those hours is essential as well. .  
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In order to resolve problems discussed above, the Commission prepare two 
distinct requirements for implementing the net benefits test. First of all, before the 
Commission decide the cost effectiveness condition for demand response resources, 
either ISO or RTO is required to run the net benefit test. Each RTO and ISO needs to 
identify a price threshold by analyzing historical data and supply curve of previous year. 
RTO and ISO have to take monthly basis into account as well. In a summary, based on 
the historical data such as supplying curve, the ISOs and RTOs make a judicious decision 
on exact point to set the monthly threshold. Moreover, the threshold price needs to be 
updated every month to keep the data vivid. Actually, the approach of setting threshold 
price adopted here may be available in the situations that the payment to demand 
response is cost-effective even it is not LMP or that demand response is compensated at 
LMP but  it is not cost-effective.  
Some commenters indicate that if demand response resources were paid LMP-G, 
a net benefit would become unnecessary. Meanwhile others argue that a net benefits test 
may ruin the former decision that DRRs have to be compensated at the LMP. Therefore, 
the Commission notes that a demand response resource should be compensated and 
treated equally as a generation resource should be because it is able to balance demand 
and supply in the energy market under cost effective condition, regulated by net benefit 
test. Hence, there is no reason to simply compensate demand response resources less than 
LMP for not using net benefit test.  
The Commission also requires each RTO and ISO to develop an additional 
research besides constructing the net benefits. The research must contain the exact time 
information when LMP payment to demand response resources can directly bring 
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customers net benefits. In order to make the result more accurate for dynamic dispatching 
of RTO and ISO, the dispatch algorithms of RTO and ISO need to be combined with 
billing unit effect. The billing unit effect theoretically helps make sure that dispatched 
demand response resources are in cost-effectiveness level. It cannot be denied that the 
more information of dispatch algorithms Commission can grasp, the more precise result, 
data will be. Therefore, it is necessary for RTO or ISO to develop an investigation, no 
matter in which form, individually or comprehensively, examining both costs and effects 
of a dynamic net benefit test implement when demand resources is being dispatched in 
both day-ahead and real-time energy markets. More importantly, the billing unit effect 
needs to be taken into consideration as well.  
2.6.3 Measurement and Verification   
As defined by the Commission, demand response curtailment can be regarded as 
reduction in actual load while the NOPR did not set either verification or measurement 
for it. Therefore, RTO or ISO has to take its own responsibility verifying and measuring 
the availability and effectiveness of demand response programs. This part discusses that 
every demand response participant develop unique baseline which is founded by RTO 
and ISO based on historical data. Moreover, the baseline will become the standard 
representing for the total dispatched amount of demand response to the wholesale market. 
Similar to compensation methods, each RTO and ISO has its own measurement and 
verification technique. Techniques are different depending on the characteristics of 
demand response providers. Some commenters think that measurement and verification 
become especially important because they greatly affect the completeness of a demand 
response program. The compensation method about paying DR LMP in all hours is 
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challenged here as well because there will be errors to measurement and verification. 
Paying LMP in all hours not only swings the accuracy of measurement and verification 
but also misrepresents customers’ normal electricity usage, especially during a long 
period. Therefore, ISO-NE suggests that pay demand response LMP in a limited amount 
of hours or days so that a demand resource could successfully and effectively clear in the 
energy market. Another saying is paying LMP in all hours gain demand response unjust 
profit for demand response because of baseline technique. Any shifts from baseline will 
be rewarded. It is totally different from the original goal getting compensation when load 
is shifted from high to low LMP hours. The management of shifting loads for all hours 
may become more and more difficult in the future even that paying LMP in each hour is 
not a current issue. Some commenters believe that in order to avoid disputation on 
measurement and verification method, the measurement and verification method should 
be uniformed. However, each RTO and ISO has own operation standard. Therefore, it 
will be difficult for the Commission to unify all measurement and verification of different 
RTOs and ISOs just like compensation methods. The Commission clarifies the 
importance of measurement and verification to demand response programs. Moreover, 
the Commission admits the diversity of measurement and verification for various RTOs 
and ISOs. But those measurements and verifications must serve under certain rules, Phase 
I and Phase II organized by the North American Energy Standards Board (NAESB). The 
Commission continues to state that paying LMP to demand response has already be 
declined by net benefit test. In conclusion, the Commission claims that ISOs and RTOs 
have to run their measurement and verification under current requirements and develop 
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appropriate modifications. Each RTO and ISO has to submit documents explaining how 
its measurement and verification protocols set baselines.  
2.6.4 Cost Allocation 
Most commenters think that the cost allocation is one way to keep demand 
response compensation level just and reasonable. Moreover, cost allocation is highly 
believed to have close connection with net benefits. There are five methods for cost 
allocation listed by commenters and usually each regional company is supposed to select 
and employ its own a method.  
Since cost allocation can address the negative balance which caused by the 
difference between the money owed by RTO to resource and the profit directly obtained 
from loads, the commission eventually decides that a cost allocation method is necessary 
to warrant that ISOs and RTOs are capable of recovering the total expenditures coming 
from demand response. Most of methods of cost allocation suggested are abandoned. A 
correct cost allocation method defined by the Commission is that each RTO and ISO 
allocates its costs based on the same proportion amount of demand response which is 
dispatched to all entities. From the report submitted by the RTOs and ISOs, the modified 
cost allocation method appropriately assign separate cost to those entities who take 
advantages on the demand reduction.   
2.6.5 Commission Jurisdiction 
Some commenters show their concerns about how to standardize demand 
response compensation in the wholesale energy market. They think it will significantly 
affect generation retail rate involving compensation for demand response. The concerns 
also catch several state commissions’ and LSEs’ attention because commission 
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jurisdiction potentially affect the compensation of demand response. As an example of 
commission jurisdiction, wide implement of advanced meters and demand response 
programs have already raise efficient usage of energy. Because of the success of 
implement, the Commission’s decision plays an important part in helping demand 
response program work better in the wholesale energy market. However, the 
Commission’s jurisdiction to set the compensation for demand response is questioned by 
other commenters. Those commenters assert that it is retail regulatory authority to not 
only consider locational policies but also set appropriate compensation level. There are 
some commenters announcing that even the retail regulatory cannot directly interfere the 
wholesale market, it impose changing retail rate design or reducing probability 
participation on demand response through commission compensation level. On the 
contrary, some commercial customers support the Commission’s authority on setting the 
compensation level. The Commission is used to be officially offered such broad authority 
including correct market flaws. In addition, retail rates represent for a combination of 
locational condition. Therefore, the Commission cannot require demand response 
compensation to be LMP minus retail rate. It is beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction.  
To address disputation, the Order first admits that the Commission is authorized 
to determine compensation level for demand response. This means that ISO and RTO has 
to accept demand response bid which is regulated under the Commission.15 Actually, it is 
tough to merge the Commission’s jurisdiction with state and federal jurisdiction because 
the Commission cannot perform any rules or actions beyond state laws or decisions. 
Furthermore, the Commission also cannot remove barriers for demand response 
regardless of state’s regulation.  However, the main purpose of the Final Rule is not 
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encroaching state’s right. It is to facilitate the Commission to make sure that the rates are 
charged at just and reasonable, not preferential. Therefore, the Commission doesn’t need 
to restrain demand response compensation because of some commenters’ opinions about 
abusing state regulatory authority. The Commission is to keep the wholesale energy at 
just, reasonable, not unfair or preferential rate. 
 
Chapter 3 Demand Response and Locational Marginal Price 
3.1 Deamond Response 
Demand response basically helps its customers reduce energy consumption. The 
customers are willing to produce a reduction from their normal electric energy 
consumption in response to the signal of an increasing price of electric energy or 
incentive payments that are designed to conduct lower consumption of electric energy. 
Especially when electricity usage reaches at critical time or electricity price is high 
enough, demand response resource will inform their consumers to reduce electricity 
consumption. Demand response can also be regarded as a method of managing consumer 
consumption of electricity. Generally, when demand response occurs, there are two ways 
that how customers response to requirement of reducing electricity consumption due to 
high price. First, customers directly reduce their demand according to retail rates based 
on wholesale prices. Secondly, customers provide demand response as an alternate 
resource to balance supply and demand in case that emergency happens in organized 
wholesale energy markets.  
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3.1.1 Difference between DR and dynamic response 
Demand response mechanisms usually shut off in respond to explicit request 
which may in many forms. The dynamic demand devices passively shut off when there 
sense stress on the grid. For example, when frequency of the grid drops, the dynamic 
demand devices choose to close for take back the balance of the grid. On the contrary, if 
the frequency passes the threshold, the dynamic demand devices will turn on creating 
more load consuming extra power.  
3.1.2 Demand response resource 
Generally, DR resource represent for a resource that is able to offer demand 
response. Wide implement of demand response resources is believed to have positive 
benefits. Those benefits can enhance reliability and stability of DR operation, minimize 
congestion and transmission constraints, avoid unstable price, increase the economic 
efficiency of deregulated electricity markets, and mitigation of potential market power.16 
Moreover, all of these benefits can also bring profits, reduction in electricity price, to its 
customers. In a word, as an alternative resource to generation, DR resource greatly 
achieves its function balancing the system when demand response resource is cost-
effectively dispatched. 
Here is the statistics directly revealing how much electricity and money are saved 
through DRR. According to US 2006, a reduction of 5% of peak demand, about 
37,853MW, has been created in the US, thereby avoiding construction of 625 combustion 
turbines which may save the cost around $2.4 billion. Then with savings from avoided 
transmission and distribution, it can rise to $3 billion per year. The reason causing these 
benefits is advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) which is one of DRR programs. 
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Moreover, the number of peak load reduction increases to 5.8% in 2008.17 In the summer 
of 2011, the number even reaches at 8.5%.18  
Even there are so many benefits in DRR programs, existence of DRR’s barriers 
still cannot be ignored. For instance, both residential and small commercial customers 
would not like to participate in those programs. They do not care about time-varying 
pricing either. Because compared to their other expenditures, saving from their total 
electricity costs are relatively small. For some large industrial customers, they also do not 
perceive the importance of load management. Normally, they are obligated to reduce 
demand under demand response programs. Besides low participation in DRR, the 
continuing changing policies about how to control DRR create ambiguous future of 
demand response resources. Furthermore, state regulators cannot accept the modified 
measurements quickly and it takes time to make a decision through conferences. Last but 
not least, judgement may differ between state regulators and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission. State regulators probably particularly focus on the states’ right 
and profits. Take this as an example, only state regulators can deal with the costs caused 
by implementation of DDR under no matter FERC support or not. Locational tradition, 
culture beliefs and absence of related knowledge also becomes barriers for wide demand 
response resources application. For instance, most of customers still think electricity 
price is static and unchangeable.  
3.1.3 Demand response programs 
The main purpose of demand response programs is to decrease customers’ 
electricity consumption or shift peak consumption based on their preferences and 
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lifestyles. Moreover, demand response programs can be split into two categories, time-
based programs and incentive-based programs.  
The time-based programs are about to handle dynamic price as the rate are 
fluctuant synchronously with the change of the real time cost of electricity. Therefore, the 
time-based programs will flatten the load curve in order to provide a reasonably high 
electricity price at peak time and relatively low electricity price during off-peak period. 
The time-based programs contain Time-of-Use (TOU) program, Critical Peak Pricing 
(CPP) program, and Real Time Pricing (RTP) program. As a common time-based 
program, TOU program determine the electricity price based on production costs in the 
same period. Thus, the price will be always cheap in low load period, moderate in off-
peak period and almost high in peak period.19 In summary, if the customers are willing to 
accept the price offered by the TOU program and shift their electricity consumption 
hours, there is no doubt that the peak demands will be effectively decreased and loads 
will be easily transferred from peak to off-peak period.  
On the other hand, different from the existence of the direct price rate signals 
varying from time to time in the time based programs, incentive based programs mainly 
encourage customers participation. The programs provide inducement or incentive 
signals to their customers. According to incentive based programs, feedback from 
customers are difficult to estimate and measure. Instead, incentive-based DR programs 
rely on a more reliable and accurate instrument or software to manage costs and preserve 
reliability. The incentive based programs consists of Direct Load Control (DLC), 
Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP), Interruptible/curtail able service (I/C), 
Demand Bidding/Buy Back, Capacitiy Market Program (CMP), and Ancillary Service 
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Markets (A/S). As one of the common incentive-based programs, DLC will remotely turn 
off or shift usage period of a customer’s electrical equipment for a short time if the 
unpredictable condition, like system reliability contingencies, happens. In exchange, their 
customers enjoy bill credits or other compensation methods. By the way, operation of 
DLC program will typically be active at peak hours. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
participation amount and load reduction for both time-based program and incentive-based 
program. 
 
Figure 3.1Application of Demand Response Programs in 2008 in the U.S. 
From the chart, there were about 275 entities who participated in the incentive-
based DR programs in 2008. And those incentive programs were capable of providing 
nearly 38,000MW load reductions. On the other hand, time-based programs were able to 
produce another 2,700MW though the participation of the time-based programs reached 
505 entities that is greater than incentive participators. About 93% of the peak load 
reductions in the U.S. were provided by all kinds of incentive-based programs. 
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3.2 Local Marginal Price 
Basically, ISOs or RTOs calculate LMPs at certain nodes, zones or locations 
within the ISO or RTO footprint. LMPs used to compensate generators. In this research, 
LMPs are used as compensation to demand response. There are variations ways how 
RTOs and ISOs calculate LMPs.  In the Final Rules of Order 745, nothing is intended to 
change RTO and ISO methods for calculating LMP. More importantly, LMP is the 
method to determine price at different locations 
In ideal situation, the system has no constraints and losses so that electric energy 
can flow to any node without any decrement through the transmission lines. Therefore, 
all LMPs will be the same. The generator with the lowest energy price would effectively 
serve the whole system. In reality, LMP usually differs from most locations. The cheapest 
megawatt cannot access all location of the grid because of existence of constraints and 
losses. These two situations will be analyzed in 3.2.3 part.  
3.2.1 Three components in LMP 
There are three components in the LMP. It will be easy to understand in this way 
LMP = System Energy Price + Transmission Congestion Cost + Cost of Marginal 
Losses20. (PLmp= PRef + PLoss + PCongestioni ) 
The energy component of all LMPs is the price for electric energy at the reference point 
that is the load-weighted average of the system node prices.21 In a simple word, the 
system energy price is optimal without congestion and losses. And price will be the same 
in every bus. Sometimes, it is known as clearing price. Congestion price is the price 
under binding constraints condition. The calculation of it contains two parts, marginal 
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unit constraints and sensitivity factors. The congestion component reveals the marginal 
cost of congestion at a node or the node price of average load-weighted of the system at 
external node. The loss component at a particular node or external node reflects the cost 
of losses. The loss price represents price of marginal losses and it will vary from different 
location. More importantly, all those three components of LMP have to be calculated in 
both day-ahead and real-time situation.  
3.2.2 Day-Ahead and Real-Time LMP 
Literally, the day-ahead LMP must be calculated in the day-ahead market. It 
applies different kinds of information, like the energy offers and bids price, from 
participants of all available location in the day-ahead market. The calculation is based on 
some components such as constrained unit, dispatching model flows, system conditions, 
least-cost, and so on. The main purpose of calculation is to minimize the three 
components of LMP, the costs of energy, congestion, and transmission losses through a 
linear method.  
The calculation of the real-time LMPs uses each market participant’s energy offer 
information. The optimized dispatch of energy is key component of this calculation. 
Similar to the calculation of the day-ahead price, the calculation of the real-time LMP 
utilizes a linear method to optimally minimize the cost of three LMP components. But 
this calculation also needs to minimize the costs for lasting operation. The actual 
changeable system condition should be put into consideration as well.  
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3.2.3 Simple examples of LMP 
Ex.1 System with no constraints displayed as Figure 3.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 A simple example of two generators and two buses 
In this example, G1 has capacity of 150MW, and the energy price is 20$/MWh 
  G2 has capacity of 150MW as well, and the energy price is 25$/MWh 
  Load, D, demands 90MW 
  Line Limit is 100MW 
Since the demand from load is 90MW which doesn’t exceed the line limit, the whole 
energy from G1 is directly delivered to load. Therefore, it is unnecessary for G2 to supply 
any energy. G1 is the only one marginal assert in this example. The LMP at A and B bus 
will be the same. LMPA = LMPB = 20$/MWh 
 
Ex2. System with a binding constraint 
Same diagram but with different data, 
G1 has capacity of 150MW, and the energy price is 20$/MWh 
G2 has capacity of 150MW as well, and the energy price is 25$/MWh 
Load, D, demands 120MW 
D 
Line Limit 
B A G1 
G2 
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Line Limit is 100MW 
In this situation, demand becomes 120MW. While energy generated from G1 can only 
achieve 100MW due to the line limitation. The rest 20MW need to be supplied by G2. 
Price at the location of each marginal asset is always equal to its offer or bid price. Then 
there will be two marginal asserts and unique LMP at different locations. LMPA = 
20$/MWh and LMPB = 25$/MWh 
In conclusion, in no constraints area, some low cost generation can be dispatched 
to cover the demand so that the price will be decreased. On the other hand, LMPs differ 
at different locations because of congestion in the system. Moreover, it is impossible to 
sever all loads with low cost. Higher-cost generation has to be dispatched to supply the 
rest demand from load which may relatively increase price at these locations.  
 
3.2.4 LMP calculation in matlab 
When the case becomes more and more complicated, it is difficult to judge how 
much power needs to be produced through each generator in order to get minimum 
payment. Therefore, matlab will facilitate to optimize the process. First, here is a simple 
example helping us know how to calculate LMP in the matlab.  
Ex1. Two units, U1 and U2, are required to generate such amount power in order to 
satisfy such amount of power demand. 
Unit 1: $40/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 800MW; 
Unit 2: $50/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 600MW; 
Demand: Pd = 700MW, 50 MW at bus 1 and 650 MW at bus 2. 
And transmission line constraint is L MW which will be given later. 
Figure 3.3 represent for a simple LMP calculation example in the Matlab. 
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Figure 3.3 LMP calculated in matlab 
To get result from matlab program, some formulations have to be established 
ahead.  
Minimize: 40Pg1 + 50Pg2; to get minimum total cost 
Subject to: Pg1 + Pg2 = 700; the amount of energy generated by two units must 
satisfy the total demand 
       0 ≤ Pg1 ≤ 800 
       0 ≤ Pg2 ≤ 600; low bound and up bound 
        Pg1 – 50 ≤ L; unit one should supply energy no more than demand at 
but 1 plus line constraint L 
Aeq * x = beq 
Aineq * x ≤ bineq; eventually, x will be solved representing for energy  
generated at unit 1 and 2 respectively 
In this example, we assume that L equals 500MW 
Matlab code: 
f = [40; 50];  
Aineq = [1, 0]; 
bineq = [550]; 
2 1 
650MW 50MW 
U
1 
U
2 
L 
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Aeq = [1, 1]; 
beq = [700]; 
lb = [0; 0]; 
ub = [800; 600]; 
x0 = []; 
options = []; 
[x, fval, exitflag, output, lambda] = linprog(f, Aineq, bineq, Aeq, beq, lb, ub, x0,options) 
 
Solution: 
 Pg1 = 550MW and Pg2 = 150MW 
Total cost = 29,500 
Energy marginal price: $50/MWh 
 Based on this example, the load at G1 node increases from 50MW to 51 MW, 
several equations will change  
 Pg1 + Pg2 = 701 
 Pg1 – 51 ≤ 500 
Then solution:  
 Pg1 = 551MW, Pg2 = 150MW 
 Total cost = 29,540 
Since total cost increment is: 29540-29500 = 40, so the LMP at G1 is: $40/MWh. 
Similarly, if the load at G2 node increase to 651MW, the solution will be: 
 Pg1 = 550MW, Pg2 = 151MW 
 Total cost = 29,550 
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Since total cost increment is: 29550-29500 = 50, so the LMP at G2 is: $50/MWh. 
Then use same approach to verify the former raised problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 A simple example of two generators and two buses 
 
Code:   f = [20; 25]; %cost coefficients  
Aineq = [1, 0];  
bineq = [100];  
Aeq = [1, 1];  
beq = [120];  
lb = [0; 0];  
ub = [150; 150];  
x0 = [];  
options = [];  
[x, fval, exitflag, output, lambda] = linprog(f, Aineq, bineq, Aeq, beq, lb, ub, 
x0,options)  
Result becomes: x = 100.00000; represent for energy distributed at G1  
                  20.0000;    G2  
D 
Line Limit 
B A G1 
G2 
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fval =2.5000e+003 ; total cost will be $2,500  
Energy price is $25/MWh 
Still change 1MW at bus 1 and bus 2 respectively 
Then: If demand at but 1 becomes 1MW  
 Pg1 = 101MW, Pg2 = 20MW  
 Total cost = 2,520  
 Total cost increment is: 2520-2500 = 20,  LMP1 = $20/MWh  
Similarly, if D = 121MW  
 Pg1 = 100MW, Pg2 = 21MW  
 Total cost = 2,525  
 Total cost increment is: 2525-2500  = 25,  LMP2 = $25/MWh  
It is obvious that the result is same to the approach I used to work the problem 
objectively.  
But in real world, line constraint will be more complicated than a constant number. The 
following example when line constraint is complex number, how to work out the problem.  
Before the example, here is a knowledge point needed to be known about p.u. system. In 
a p.u. system, when power is transferred from point 1 to point 2, like picture,  
Figure 3.4 tells how to perform complex number calculation in a p.u. system. 
 
 
                              ①                                                                ② 
Figure 3.4 Complex number calculation in p.u. system 
Then:  
p 1∠α1 1∠α2 
 
jx 
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p = (α2 – α1) / x ; α2 and α1 are in radius 
In this case, constraints will be easily obtained in a complex problem.  
Ex2. Unit 1: $40/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 800MW; 
Unit 2: $50/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 600MW; 
Unit 3: $55/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 600MW; 
Unit 4: $60/MWh, Pmin = 0MW, Pmax = 700MW; 
 Demand: Pd = 1500MW, and load distributions are shown on the figure.  
 Transmission line impedances in per unit and constraints are labeled in the figure. 
Sbase is set to 100MW. Figure 3.5 reveals a more complicated problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 LMP calculation of a complex problem in the matlab 
Bus 1 is chosen as the reference, 1∠0°. Moreover, δ2, δ3and δ4 represent machine 
angle for G2 and G3 respectively.   
Minimize: 40Pg1 + 50 Pg2 + 55Pg3 +60Pg4 
Subject to: Pg1 + Pg2 + Pg3 + Pg4 = 1500/100 
200MW 350MW 
450MW 
L4 
0.25j 
500MW 
G3 
G2 G1 0.1j 
L1 MW 
0.125j 
L2 MW 
0.2j 
L3 MW 
G4 
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       Pg2 = (δ2 – 0) / 0.1 + (δ2 – δ3) / 0.2 + 350 / 100 
       Pg3 = (δ3 – δ2) / 0.2 + (δ3 – δ4) / 0. 25 + 450 / 100 
       Pg4 = (δ4 – 0) / 0.125 + (δ4 – δ3) / 0.25 + 500 / 100 
       δ2 / 0.1 ≤ L1 
      - δ2 / 0.1 ≤ L1 
      δ4 / 0.125 ≤ L2 
      - δ4 / 0.125 ≤ L2 
      (δ2 – δ3) / 0.2 ≤ L3 
- (δ2 – δ3) / 0.2 ≤ L3 
(δ3 – δ4) / 0.25 ≤ L4 
- (δ3 – δ4) / 0.25 ≤ L4 
0 ≤ Pg1 ≤ 800 / 100 
0 ≤ Pg2 ≤ 600 / 100 
0 ≤ Pg3 ≤ 600 / 100 
0 ≤ Pg4 ≤ 700 / 100 
Aeq * x = beq 
Aineq * x ≤ bineq 
Simplify above formula and apply them into matlab. 
If L = [250, 200, 200, 250] MW 
Code:  
[L1, L2, L3, L4] = deal(2.50, 2.00, 2.00, 2.50); 
f = [40, 50, 55, 60, 0, 0, 0]; 
Aeq = [1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0; 
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       0, 1, 0, 0, -15, 5, 0; 
       0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 4, 12; 
       0, 0, 1, 0, 5, -9, 4]; 
beq = [15; 3.5; 5; 4.5]; 
Aineq = [0, 0, 0, 0, -10, 0, 0; 
         0, 0, 0, 0, 10, 0, 0; 
         0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -8; 
         0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8; 
         0, 0, 0, 0, 5, -5, 0; 
         0, 0, 0, 0, -5, 5, 0; 
         0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, -4; 
         0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -4, 4]; 
bineq = [L1; L1; L2; L2; L3; L3; L4; L4]; 
lb = [0; 0; 0; 0; -inf; -inf; -inf]; 
ub = [8; 6; 6; 7; inf; inf; inf]; 
x0 = []; 
options = []; 
[x, fval, exitflag, output, lambda] = linprog(f,Aineq,bineq,Aeq,beq,lb,ub,x0,options);  
 
Solution:  
 x = [8.0000; 2.3750; 1.1250; 3.5000; -0.2000; -0.3750; 0.2500] 
 Total cost =  $71,062.5   
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Chapter 4 The Proposed Compensation Method 
This research proposes one possible compensation method for demand response, 
which could unify current compensation methods. In the approach, the basic concept is 
that the demand response providers will get compensation in amount of how much 
energy customers save. Figure 4.1 shows the basic concept of optimal compensation 
method.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Brief introduction of compensation method 
At point a, suppose there is a certain amount of kWs which is obtained in the day-ahead 
market. Point b represents the value actual load value detected by smart meter. Ideally, 
the compensation to demand response resources should be (a – b) ×ΔL. The approach is 
mainly about to compare and combine all current compensation methods and then get one 
optimal method in this research. According to experience, net benefits can reach 
enormously huge at peak period which potentially means demand response has 
apparently positive affect at peak period. Therefore, a cost-effective analysis will be 
ΔL 
b 
 a 
Time 
 
kW 
Reduced Load 
Actual Load 
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unnecessary at peak-load period. Demand response will be compensated at LMP during 
peak-load period. 
The following chart similarly represents the energy consumption in one community. In 
this chart, there are two lines representing for energy assumption in day-ahead market 
and real-time energy consumption respectively. Figure 4.2 is a close simulation to a real 
problem. 
 
Figure 4.2 Statistic applied in real situation 
Suppose LMP is 30$/MWh;  
Total compensation = (289.9-250.17) × 30 × 3 = $3575.7 ; at peak period 3-6PM 
This is a simple example which has similar to reality. But as mentioned before, 
day-ahead market is hourly calculated and real-time market calculate per 5 minutes. 
Therefore, the different units need to be carefully recorded and calculated when the data 
are measured. No matter how complicated data it is, the result will still be available with 
the help of advance metering technique and certain measurements. 
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At Low demand period, demand response can play as an emergent supply to 
generation in case that disaster and outage happens. Just like the example mentioned 
before, demand response resources were active to inform their customers to reduce 
energy consumption to maintain the grid balance because 20% power plant was off-line 
caused by a disaster happened in the Northeast area in the winter of 2014. In this situation, 
when demand response resources are active, they still need to be compensated at LMP. 
The contribution of demand response at emergent period cannot be ignored. Meanwhile, 
the customers of demand response resources will be compensated with certain credits for 
paying electricity bill in the future as well.  
At off peak period, net-benefits test or cost effective test becomes especially 
important to determine whether demand response resources should be compensated at the 
price referred to LMP or not in this approach. If the net-benefit test or cost effective test 
proves that it is reasonable to pay demand response with price related LMP, demand 
response will be compensated at amount of  LMP – Mi ,where Mi contains the money of 
implementing cost effective test.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
The court is about to rehear the case, Order 745, in order to prevent a setback to 
demand response in the wholesale energy market. This research provides discussions of 
demand response, locational marginal price, and Order 745. There may be limitations on 
current demand response compensation methods, which may cause disputations among 
different parties. Based on existing methods, this thesis proposes a possible compensation 
method for demand response, which may be reasonable and may lessen disputations.  
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